

Bellerophon: Tactical Theorem Proving for Hybrid Systems




Nathan Fulton, Stefan Mitsch, Brandon Bohrer, André Platzer
Carnegie Mellon University



Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-Physical Systems combine computation and control.



Hybrid Systems model combinations of discrete and continuous dynamics.

Bellerophon

Verifying hybrid systems is hard.

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- Build on a sound core.

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- Implement high-level primitives for hybrid systems proofs.

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Verifying hybrid systems is hard.

Bellerophon demonstrates how to tackle hybrid systems with tactics:

- Build on a sound core.
- Implement high-level primitives for hybrid systems proofs.
- Automate common constructions (for ODEs and control software)

Bellerophon

Theorem	Bellerophon LOC	Conceptual Proof Steps	Hybrid Systems Axiom Applications
Static Safety	12	71	30,355
Passive-Friendly Safety	45	140	68,620
Orientation Safety	15	108	173,989
Pass Intersection Liveness	234	440	61,878

KeYmaera X: Trustworthy Foundations

Interactive Reachability Analysis

- Bellerophon combinator language
- Bellerophon standard library for hybrid systems
- Demonstration



Bellerophon for Automation and Tooling

Conclusions & Resources


KeYmaera X enables trustworthy automation for hybrid systems analysis:

- A well-defined **logical foundations**,
- implemented in a **small trustworthy core**
- that ensures correctness of **automation and tooling**.

Trustworthy Foundations

Hybrid Programs


$a := t$




Trustworthy Foundations

Hybrid Programs

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
$a;b$



Trustworthy Foundations

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


?P

If P is true: no change

If P is false: terminate


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


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
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
$a \cup b$



Trustworthy Foundations

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


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
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$a;b$




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Trustworthy Foundations Hybrid Programs

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


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
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
a^*



$a;b$




$a \cup b$



Trustworthy Foundations Hybrid Programs

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


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
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
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
$a; b$



$a \cup b$



$x' = f$



Trustworthy Foundations
Reachability Specifications

$[a]P$ “after every execution of a , P ”

$\langle a \rangle P$ “after some execution of a , P ”

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
$\text{init} \rightarrow [\{x := u(x); x' = f(x)\}^*]\text{safe}$

Hello, World

```

{
  {?Dive U r := r_p};
  t:=0;
  {x' = v,
   V' = f(v, g, r), t'=1
   & 0 ≤ x & t ≤ T}
} *

```




Control: Continue diving if safe, else open parachute.

Plant: Downward velocity determined by gravity, air resistance.

Trustworthy Foundations

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
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
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
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
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
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Trustworthy Foundations

Reachability Specifications

(Dive & $g > 0$ & ...) \rightarrow

[{
 { ?Dive \cup $r := r_p$ } ;
 { $x' = v$,
 $v' = f(v, g, r)$
 & $0 \leq x$ }
} *] **($x = 0 \rightarrow m \leq v$)**




Trustworthy Foundations

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  {  $x' = v,$   
     $v' = f(v, g, r)$   
    &  $0 \leq x$  }  
} * ] ( $x = 0 \rightarrow m \leq v$ )
```



If the parachuter is on the ground, their speed is safe ($m \leq v \leq 0$)

Dynamical Axioms

$$[x := t] f(x) \leftrightarrow f(t)$$

$$[a; b] P \leftrightarrow [a] [b] P$$


$$[a \cup b] P \leftrightarrow ([a] P \ \& \ [b] P)$$

$$[x' = f \ \& \ Q] P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow P)$$

...


Introduction to Differential Dynamic Logic

Trusted Core




Introduction to Differential Dynamic Logic

Trustworthy Implementations



Introduction to Differential Dynamic Logic

Prover Core Comparison



Bellerophon

Bellerophon enables interactive verification and tool development:

Bellerophon

Bellerophon enables interactive verification and tool development:

- A **standard library** of common proof techniques.

Bellerophon

Bellerophon enables interactive verification and tool development:

- A **standard library** of common proof techniques.
- A **combinator language/library** for **decomposing** theorems and **composing** proof strategies.

Bellerophon Standard Library

Tactic	Meaning
<code>prop</code>	Applies propositional reasoning exhaustively.
<code>unfold</code>	Symbolically executes discrete, loop-free programs.
<code>loop (J, i)</code>	Applies loop invariance axiom to position i .
<code>dI, dG, dC, dW</code>	Reasoning principles for differential equations.

Bellerophon Standard Library

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


1000+

Bellerophon

Combinators

Tactic	Meaning
<code>prop</code>	Applies propositional reasoning exhaustively.
<code>unfold</code>	Symbolically executes discrete, loop-free programs.
<code>loop(J, i)</code>	Applies loop invariance axiom to position i , extends J with constants.
<code>dI, dG, dC, dW</code>	Reasoning principles for differential equations.



Combinator	Meaning
<code>A ; B</code>	Execute A on current goal, then execute B on the result.
<code>A B</code>	Try executing A on current goal. If A fails, execute B on current goal.
<code>A*</code>	Run A until it no longer applies.
<code>A<(B₁, B₂, ... , B_N)</code>	Execute A on current goal to create N subgoals. Run B_i on subgoal i .



Isolating Interesting Questions

(Dive & $g > 0$
& ...) →
[{




} *] ($x=0 \rightarrow m \leq v$)


Isolating Interesting Questions



Loop invariant holds initially







Loop invariant is preserved



Loop invariant implies safety

Isolating Interesting Questions




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
Loop invariant is preserved

Loop invariant implies safety

Isolating Interesting Questions



Isolating Interesting Questions



Isolating Interesting Questions

```
prop ; loop(J, 1) <(
  QE, /* Real arith. solver */
  QE,
  unfold ; <(
    ... /* parachute open case */
    ... /* parachute closed case */
  )
)
```

Trustworthy Standard Library at High Abstraction Level

$$J \rightarrow [\{\text{ctrl}; \text{plant}\}^*]J$$

$$J = v > -\text{sqrt}(g/pr) > m \ \& \ \dots$$


Parachute Open Case:

$$v \geq v_0 - gt$$

$$\geq v_0 - gT$$


$$> -\text{sqrt}(g/pr)$$

Inductive invariants



Interactive Verification in Bellerophon

From Axioms to Proof Steps




DI Axiom:

$$[\{x'=f\&Q\}]P \leftrightarrow ([?Q]P \leftarrow (Q \rightarrow [\{x'=f\&Q\}]P'))$$

Interactive Verification in Bellerophon

From Axioms to Proof Steps



DI Axiom:


$$[\{x'=f\&Q\}]P \leftrightarrow ([?Q]P \leftarrow (Q \rightarrow [\{x'=f\&Q\}]P'))$$

Example:

$$[v' = r_p v^2 - g, t' = 1] v \geq v_0 - gt$$

Interactive Verification in Bellerophon

From Axioms to Proof Steps



DI Axiom:

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Example:

$$[v' = r_p v^2 - g, t' = 1] v \geq v_0 - gt \quad \leftrightarrow$$

...

$$[v' := r_p v^2 - g] [t' := 1] v' \geq -g * t' \quad \leftrightarrow$$

$$r_p v^2 - g \geq -g \quad \leftrightarrow$$

$$r_p \geq 0$$

Interactive Verification in Bellerophon

From Axioms to Proof Steps

dl Tactic:

DI Axiom:

$$\{\{x'=f \& Q\}\}P \leftrightarrow ([?Q]P \leftarrow (Q \rightarrow \{\{x'=f \& Q\}\}P'))$$

Side derivation:

$$\begin{aligned} (v \geq v_0 - gt)' & \leftrightarrow \\ (v)' \geq (v_0 - gt)' & \leftrightarrow \\ (v)' \geq (v_0 - gt)' & \leftrightarrow \\ (v)' \geq (v_0)' - (gt)' & \leftrightarrow \\ (v)' \geq (v_0)' - (t(g)' + g(t')) & \leftrightarrow \\ v' \geq v_0' - (tg' + gt') & \leftrightarrow \end{aligned}$$

$$H = r_p \geq 0 \ \& \ r_a \geq 0 \ \& \ g > 0 \ \& \ \dots$$

Example:

$$\begin{aligned} [v' = r_p v^2 - g, t' = 1] v \geq v_0 - gt & \leftrightarrow \\ \dots & \leftrightarrow \\ [v' := r_p v^2 - g] [t' := 1] v' \geq -g * t' & \leftrightarrow \\ r_p v^2 - g \geq -g & \leftrightarrow \\ H \rightarrow r_p \geq 0 & \end{aligned}$$

Automation and Tooling

Hybrid Systems Analyses can be built on top of KeYmaera X.

Examples:

- ODE Solver
- Runtime Monitoring

Automation and Tooling

Solving Differential Equations

1. Use untrusted code to find a conjecture.

Untrusted ODE Solver

Axiomatic Solver
(Bellerophon Program)

2. Prove the conjecture systematically, leveraging standard library.

AXIOM BASE

```
[x:=t]f(x) ↔ f(t)
[a;b]P ↔ [a][b]P
[aUb]P ↔ ([a]P & [b]P)
[a*]P ↔ (J→P & J→[b]J)
[x'=f&Q]P → (Q → P)
...
```

KeYmaera X Core

Q.E.D.

Automation and Tooling

Solving Differential Equations

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Untrusted ODE Solver



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
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[x:=t]f(x) ↔ f(t)
[a;b]P ↔ [a][b]P
[aUb]P ↔ ([a]P & [b]P)
[a*]P ↔ (J→P & J→[b]J)
[x'=f&Q]P → (Q → P)
...
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KeYmaera X Core

Q.E.D.

Automation and Tooling


ModelPlex Tactic



Toward Automated Deduction

Other Proof Automation & Tooling


- **Taylor Series**
- **Bifurcations**
- Limit Cycles
- Numerical tools
- ...



Toward Automated Deduction

Other Proof Automation & Tooling

- **Taylor Series**
- **Bifurcations**
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Other Tooling:

- Component-based Verification
- Web UI



Conclusion

There is a wide gap between **sound foundations** for hybrid systems and **practical interactive theorem proving technology** for cyber-physical systems verification.

Conclusion


There is a wide gap between **sound foundations** for hybrid systems and **practical interactive theorem proving technology** for cyber-physical systems verification.

Bellerophon demonstrates how to verify hybrid systems using tactics.

Conclusion

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
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DI Tactic:

Side derivation:

$(v \geq v_0 - gt)'$ ↔
 $\dots \leftrightarrow$
 $\dots \leftrightarrow$
 \dots
 $H = r_p \geq 0 \ \& \ r_a \geq 0$
 $\ \& \ g > 0 \ \& \ \dots$

DI Axiom:

$[[x'=f\ \& \ Q]]P \leftrightarrow ([?Q]P \leftarrow (Q \rightarrow [[x'=f\ \& \ Q]]P'))$


Example:

$[v' = r_p v^2 - g, t' = 1] v \geq v_0 - gt$ ↔
 \dots ↔
 $[v' := r_p v^2 - g] [t' := 1] v' \geq -g * t'$ ↔
 $r_p v^2 - g \geq -g$ ↔
 $H \rightarrow r_p \geq 0$

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
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Project Website (start here) keymaeraX.org

Online Demo web.keymaeraX.org

Open Source (GPL) github.com/lis-lab/KeYmaeraX-release

Thanks: 15-424 students, **Jean-Baptiste Jeannin**, Khalil Ghorbal, **Yanni Kouskoulas** et al., and many others!

Developers:

- Stefan Mitsch
- Nathan Fulton
- André Platzer
- Brandon Bohrer
- Jan-David Quesel
- Yong Kiam Tan
- Markus Völp


Differential Ghosts

Parachute Closed:

$J \ \& \ t=0 \ \& \ r=r_p \ \rightarrow$

$[x' = v, v' = rv^2 - g \ \& \ 0 \leq x \ \& \ t \leq T] v > -\sqrt{g/pr} \ \> \ m$

Proof requires a **differential ghost** because the property is **not inductive**.



Differential Ghosts

An example differential ghost.

$$x > 0 \rightarrow [x' = -x] x > 0$$


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Ghost: $y' = y/2$

Conserved: $1 = xy^2$



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
$$\text{Conserved: } 1 = xy^2$$

Notice:

$$x > 0 \leftrightarrow \exists y. 1 = xy^2$$

Therefore, suffices to show:

$$1 = xy^2 \rightarrow \exists y. [x' = -x, y' = y/2] 1 = xy^2$$



Prover Core Comparison

Tool	Trusted LOC (approx.)
KeYmaera X	1,682 (out of 100,000+)
KeYmaera	65,989
Isabelle/Pure	8,113
Coq	20,000
HSolver	20,000
dReal	50,000
SpaceEx	100,000