Safe Reinforcement Learning via Formal Methods

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Carnegie Mellon University

Safety-Critical Systems




"How can we provide people with cyber-physical systems they can bet their lives on?" - Jeannette Wing


Autonomous Safety-Critical Systems




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


φ



pos < stopSign</pre>





Reinforcement Learning

Approach: prove that control software achieves a specification with respect to a model of the physical system.

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


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
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
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


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
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
Accurate, analyzable models often exist!

{?safeAccel;accel U brake U ?safeTurn; turn};
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


- Computer-checked proofs of safety specification
- Formal proofs mapping model to runtime monitors


Model-Based Verification Isn't Enough

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Our Contribution


Justified Speculative Control is an approach toward provably safe reinforcement learning that:


1. learns to resolve non-determinism without sacrificing formal safety results


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
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
- 1. learns to resolve non-determinism without sacrificing formal safety results
- 2. allows and directs speculation whenever model mismatches occur





















Use a theorem prover to prove:

(init \rightarrow [{{accelUbrake};0DEs}*](safe)) $\leftrightarrow \phi$



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Learning to **Safely** Resolve Non-determinism

<u>Main Theorem</u>: If the ODEs are accurate, then our formal proofs transfer from the non-deterministic model to the learned (deterministic) policy via the model monitor.

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What about the physical model?

{pos'=vel,vel'=acc}






Observe & compute reward


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
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



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
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




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Speculation is Justified




Leveraging Verification Results to Learn Better


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Use a real-valued version of the model monitor as a reward signal

Observe & compute reward


{brake, accel, turn}






Justified Speculative Control provides the best of logic and learning:


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
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
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